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STATES, PROVINCES, AND CROSS-BORDER
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
Carl Grenier*
Since I met Matt Schaefer a few years ago, I knew that he would do a
very good job covering the whole ground and the theoretical aspects of this
topic. I am not a lawyer. He did that much better than I could ever do it. So I
have decided to focus on the Canadian angle and a practical approach to
involvement by provinces in dispute settlement of trade disputes. I want to
cover several points. How did Canadian provinces become involved in trade
policies? Is it really a new phenomenon? It did not happen through disputes
at first. It happened through trade negotiations. We have had at least two
periods, the pre-FTA, pre-NAFTA period, and the period since. I am going to
use the Softwood Lumber' dispute as an illustration, and provide some
prescriptions for the future.
Matt did mention that the Canadian situation regarding the involvement
of provinces is different from the U.S. situation, and indeed it is. But
something that is very clear in the Canadian constitution is the fact that
international trade is a federal matter. There was no ambiguity about this. I
do not think any provinces have ever really contested that. There is also a
celebrated case, the Labour Conventions Case2 that goes back to 1937 which
basically said that, in matters international, the provincial jurisdiction also
carried. That is why, for instance, when Canadian delegations go to the
International Labor Organization (ILO) in Geneva every year, there are
provinces along. They have been along for quite a while. The same is true
with education, for instance, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD). So this is a well-established thing.
But in trade, usually the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction. In
the pre-FTA, pre-NAFTA period, not only was it a federal jurisdiction, it was
virtually a Minister of Finance monopoly, because we are talking about
tariffs and quotas. So the Minister of Finance really dealt with this. This
started to change in the early 1970s with the launch of the Tokyo Round. The
Tokyo Round was launched in September of 1973. But in April of that year,
* Grenier bio.
In the Matter of Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, ECC-94-1904-01
USA; Memorandum Opinions and Order, 3 Aug. 1994.
2 See Attorney Gen. Can. v. Attorney Gen. Ont. [1937] 1 D.L.R. 673 (P.C.)(Labour
Conventions case).
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the Quebec Minister for Trade, Pierre Pettigrew, and a bit later his
counterpart in Alberta, called for the federal government to involve the
provinces in the preparation for the upcoming multi-lateral trade
negotiations.
Why did they suddenly do that? It was essentially because on the menu of
the multi-lateral trade negotiations, there were non-tariff barriers for the first
time. These non-tariff barriers included subsidies, non-technical barriers to
trade, the standards, and the provincial procurement side. These, of course,
were the sole purview of the central government, but they are also very much
the business of provincial or state governments. And so this was the basic
idea behind the call for provincial involvement in the preparations for the
multi-lateral trade negotiations.
What the federal government did in answer to this call was to set up a
deputy minister's committee which met twice a year to review the agenda of
the negotiations, the progress of the negotiations, and to have a general
exchange of views. This worked pretty well until 1985 beyond the multi-
lateral trade negotiation, and since the Tokyo Round, which ended in 1979. It
worked well becausesince this was the first time that these non-tariff barriers
were being negotiated, the obligations did not go very far. So the provinces,
which were constrained in some instances, notably in the subsidy area, did
not mind much.
In that period, there were a few cases that I am going to mention. There
was the Ontario sales tax rebate on cars made in Canada. Of course, most
cars made in Canada are made in Ontario. And there was a five percent tax at
the time. It stayed in place for about three months before Ontario desisted
after the federal government intervened. A similar case occurred a few years
later regarding gold coins. We were discriminating. And this, again, was an
Ontario initiative, quickly followed by Quebec again, not to apply the sales
tax to the Canadian gold coin. We werediscriminating against South Africa,
but this did not raise a lot of emotions in Canada, because South Africa was
still a pariah state at that time.
Another case, which went to the dispute settlement phase, regarded wine
mark-ups.3 In Canada, as in quite a few of your states, we have state
monopolies on the sale of liquor and wine. The mark-ups are pretty steep.
They were increased sharply in 1983. The European Community complained
quickly, and we wound up at the GATT, and we lost. Not only did we lose on
wine, but it also spread to beer.4
3 Canada-Import, Distribution, and Sale of Alcoholic Drinks by the Canadian Provincial
Marketing Agencies, (1987-88) 35S B.I.S.D. 37 (Panel Report adopted Mar. 22, 1988).
4 United States - Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages (1991-92), 39S
B.I.S.D. 206.
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Things started to change in the mid-1980s. The reason it started to
changewas that the mid-1980s were a very fertile period for trade policy and
trade negotiations in general. In 1983, the federal government came out with
a trade policy review, the first one in many years which, among other things,
called for the opening of negotiations with U.S. sectoral free trade
negotiations. It was quite timid, but it was the beginning. And there were
consultations with the U.S. government, which expressed interest during
1984, just prior to the election. Then, of course, we changed governments,
and the new government was even more interested. You are familiar with the
Shamrock Summit in Quebec and Mr. Mulroney and his letter to President
Reagan in September of that year, which basically launched the free trade
negotiations.
5
To prepare for this within Canada, there were a couple of important
meetings. Both took place in Halifax. First there was a ministerial meeting in
September, and then in November there was a first minister's meeting. This
was where the Mulroney doctrine of full provincial participation in trade
negotiations, and education for settlement of trade disputes was enunciated.
What was meant by full provincial participation? This first minister's
meeting was really unprecedented. There were twelve of them over a two-
year period. Also, there were supposed to be ad hoc ministerial meetings
although only one was actually held. The Prime Minister and the premiers
assumed control of this process. More importantly, in my view because I was
a bureaucrat at that time, was Mr. Eastman's federal provincial committee
monthly meetings, which went through the whole gamut of trade negotiations
and subjects seeking provincial views. Most of the provinces were not shy to
tell the federal government about their views on the federal approach. There
were over twenty of these meetings and hey were quite interesting.
The provinces recruited former federal trade negotiators and various
senior officials. Quebec, for instance, recruited Jake Warren, who was a
former Ambassador to the United States, a former Trade Commissioner, a
former High Commissioner to Britain anda long-time trade negotiator
himself. Ontario had Bob Latimer, who was former Assistant Deputy
Minister of Trade for the federal government. Thomas Shoyama worked for
Saskatchewan, and so on. So the provinces were well equipped to deal with
the federal government, but not all of them used these consultants.
For instance, Ontario opposed the notion of free trade with the United
States. It waited until the very last few weeks before making its position
5 See James Holbein, The Administration of Chapter 19 Binational Proceedings Under
NAFTA, 5 U.S.-MEx. L. J., 57 (describing how the Shamrock Summit came about). See also
Louis F. DelDuca, Teachings of the European Community Experience for Developing
Regional Organizations, 11 DICK. J. INT'LL. 485.
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known in these meetings. After the negotiations were over, the federal
provincial meetings continued at the official level. Some provinces felt that
the mechanisms that had been put in place by the federal government
allowing provincial participation in the trade negotiations ought to be
reflected in the implementation phase of these agreements. Of course,
dispute settlement is very much a part of this.
So, in 1991, provinces met together without the federal government to
codify the practices that had been put in place by the federal government. We
came up with a document after approximately eleven months. Unfortunately,
at the political level, that document did not go very far. The Minister of
Fisheries, John Crosby did not want to accept that document. He did not want
this document to become some sort of federal provincial agreement. An
appeal was made to the Prime Minister, who turned it down. So this attempt
at codifying federal provincial cooperation in the matter of trade negotiations
and trade dispute settlements did not succeed.
After a few years and many attempts by the provinces, a best practices
document was tabled at a Federal Provincial Meeting with officials in
September 1998. This looked quite a bit like the initial document, but it came
this time from the federal government. What it does is set out a series of
practices. For instance, the federal provincial meetings, and there are many
of them, hold an annual meeting of ministers responsible for trade. This is
usually chaired by a province. There is an annual deputy minister's meeting.
This is still going on. And there are quarterly meetings of a committee called
C-trade. C is for Canada. This meets four or five times a year to discuss
technical matters related to trade. An Internet trade policy has been set up to
speed information exchanges. There are also provisions for trade
negotiations. I will not go into this, but they are very similar to what I have
already described.
Let us turn to the matter of trade disputes and see what is provided for
here. The provinces are apprised as soon as a complaint has been lodged
against Canada or by Canada. There are three territories now that are not
provinces but are participants in these meetings. These views, therefore, are
sought in a timely manner on an on going basis regarding the conduct of any
proceeding. The federal government shares relevant documentation, such as
submissions, interim reports, notices of appeal, and facility cooperation. This
means that as a province or a territory you are in the next room. You are not
at the table.
On a case-by-case basis, if a provincial or territorial measure is the focus
of a dispute, which is often the case because of the importance of non-tariff
barriers, the representatives of provinces and territories will be invited to
participate in proceedings as a member of the Canadian delegation in the role
4
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of technical advisors, observers and advisors who act in a silent capacity
unless otherwise specifically requested by the head of the Canadian
delegation. Circumstances may require limits on delegation size. And these
provisions have been tested and have been used. Again, there are some
weasel words that could be used to really restrict provincial participation. But
by and large, they have not been used to that effect.
Next I would like to turn to the Softwood Lumber case as an illustration
of provincial involvement in dispute settlement. It was mentioned yesterday
by a couple of people that there are very old roots to this so-called problem.
We came very near to a shooting war in 1832 over softwood lumber. Militia
and regular troops were massed along the Aroostook River in Maine and
New Brunswick. They did not shoot, but they came close. There have been
disputes on and off about softwood lumber, but basically, starting from 1913,
the stuff was going into the United States duty-free. The reason was clear.
The United States has not been self-sufficient in softwood lumber production
for over a century. There was an exception, of course, in the 1930s with the
Smoot-Hawley Tariff where every tariff was hiked quite substantially, but
then it came down again. Canada was one of the first countries to take
advantage of the new legislation for bilateral agreements in 1935. So there
was an agreement in 1935 and 1938, and the duties came down to zero very
quickly.
We did not have much of a problem in the trade of softwood lumber for
the ensuing decades. A very important change occurred in the United States,
which helps explain why we started having problems in the early 1980s. The
Department of Commerce took over from the Department of Treasury the
settlement and oversight of trade relations between the United States and
other countries. Of course, the reason is clear; the Department of Commerce
is looking after U.S. industry the world over.
So in 1981 and 1982 there was a big recession, and a section 322
investigation of the Tariff Act was requested by some lumber producers of
the Pacific Northwest. They were mostly smaller producers, dependent upon
lumber from public land. When the price of lumber went up, they could not
afford it. They could not cut it, and had to watch all those Canadian trucks of
softwood lumber coming across the border. Of course, the trucks were
coming because the lumber was needed. There was no way U.S. production
could have been sufficient for U.S. needs.
The section 332 investigation did not conclude that there was a problem,
but it did not stop the first coalition from bringing a complaint in 1983 and
1984. As you know, Canada won. The provincial involvement in that first
6 Pub. L. No. 71-361, 49 Stat. 590 (codified as amended as scattered sections of 14
U.S.C.).
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case was quite different from how it is handled today. For instance, Quebec
was sharing lawyers with British Columbia. The same lawyer was working
for the industry and the government. This is no longer the case. We won the
case in 1984, but it was not the end of the problem. It came back in 1986
under very different circumstances, even though U.S. legislation had not
really changed. Canadian practices were virtually the same. The second
investigation came when we were right at the beginning of the Free Trade
Agreement negotiations. This played a large role in Canada's decision to
settle out of court. We had the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU),
which set an export tax of fifteen percent on Canadian lumber going into the
United States - fifteen percent, which could vary province by province if
stumpage rates were increased, or obligations on the company were generally
increased.
This happened, for instance, in British Columbia less than a year after the
MOU came into force. British Columbia raised stump rates by something
like 600 million dollars overnight and went to zero export tax. Quebec did it
in stages and was back to something like three percent when the MOU was
terminated in 1991. Terminating the MOU in 1991 was perceived as a hostile
act here, even though it was fully legal for Canada to do so, and less than five
percent of lumber trade was still being held under the MOU. There was a
letter signed by sixty senators. The United States and the U.S. Trade
Representative (USTR) in particular, took very vigorous action.
We won this one essentially because of the new dispute settlement
mechanism of the NAFTA. We won, and then we sat down a year and a half
later and negotiated the Softwood Lumber Agreement. Why did we do that?
For quite a few reasons: to include a billion dollars worth of leverage, for
want of a better word, by the Department of Commerce. They were dragging
their feet in reimbursing the money that was owed Canadian companies that
had been paid during the countervailing duty investigation and appeal, a
renewed threat of countervailing duty (CVD) by the Coalition for Fair
Lumber Imports, a constitutional challenge of Chapter 19 in the United
States by the coalition, and a very sharp case of battle fatigue in Canada. We
had been fighting this battle for quite a while already.
I should have told you right from the beginning, of course, that I was not
representing the Quebec government view here. I no longer work for the
Quebec government.
What has this done? There have been a number of consequences to the
Softwood Lumber Agreement. First, and this is what the home builders are
really complaining about here in the United States, lumber prices no longer
follow trends in the housing market. You can seebefore the case was settled
in 1994, and just before the Softwood Lumber Agreement was negotiated, that
6
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the trends in the price of lumber tracked the trends in the price of housing.
This is no longer the case. The spikes are produced by the quota itself. There
are quarterly quotas within the yearly quota. Thisis not good for anyone
using lumber in the United States. We have lost a lot of business because of
this. We estimate that, for the last four years, we would have sold upwards of
4.1 billion dollars worth of lumber. Our market share now would probably be
somewhere around forty percent instead of the current share of less than
thirty-four percent.
There has been a lot of money made because of this agreement, and this
is why we think the problem will continue for quite a while. Just look at the
estimated profit flowing from the Softwood Lumber Agreement. The five
known members of the Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports in the United
States have made a lot of money from a very modest investment. We
estimate that they put in something like two to three million dollars a year on
the average on this issue, and they are reaping profits of more than 300
million dollars a year because of the agreement. So there is no way that they
are going to let go, and we assume that they will not let go.
Another result of the higher cost of wood, is increased integration of
substitutes. For wood-based products, it is accelerating. For other products
such as steel and concrete, it is also dramatic. In three or four years, we lost
ten percent of the market share, and this includes U.S., and Canadian
producers.
There has also been a shift in export production within Canada, because
only four provinces are under constraint by the Softwood Lumber Agreement.
The non-quota provinces were exporting about 1.6 billion board feet before
the agreement, and only sixty percent of that was going to the United States.
Now they are probably exporting 2.5 million board feet, and just about
everything is going to the United States, and why not? The price spread
between Canada and the United States has widened. In 1995, just before the
agreement, it was under $20.00. Right now it is nearly $100.00.
What we are aiming for here is a consensus between the lumber industry
and the governments of Canada. This is not easy, a return to free trade at the
expiry of the Softwood Lumber Agreement. There is intensive preparation for
the next U.S. trade offensive, because we are quite sure there will be one.,
We are not adverse to consultations, although the last time we had
consultations, they quickly turned into negotiations.
The way we are proceeding this time is quite different from what we have
done in the past. We are building political support in the United States to
avoidunilateral U.S. solutions, to influence the terms of any future U.S. trade
action, because you can influence the terms of these actions, and to deal from
a position of strength if it were necessary to negotiate at some point. Our
7
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common goal, and this is true now of five provincial associations and the
Free Trade Lumber Council, is to get back to free trade. And, as far as we are
concerned, the quickest and least expensive way to get there is to let the
agreement expire.
Why is it better to fight than to fold? We believe that due process is more
likely to produce a fairer outcome than lopsided so-called negotiations on a
sectoral basis. We know we can win. We have done it before, and we are
able to make these legal victories stick the next time with the help of our U.S.
allies. We also believe that as an industry, we should have more regard for
our U.S. customers and our U.S. competitors. Canada is always better off
when we rely on a rules-based dispute settlement system with the United
States because of the size and power disparity. This was underlined many
times yesterday in various presentations. The dispute settlement mechanisms
that we have at our disposal are better than they have ever been, both under
NAFTA and under the WTO. The time to negotiate, if we have to negotiate,
is at the end of the process. That is, after final adjudication, not before.
What are the lessons for the future that we can draw from this and other
cases? I think the first one is that the provinces will use their standing under
Chapter 19.7 There is a big difference, between Chapter 19 and the WTO
process where we do not have standing as provinces. The provinces will act
in their own interest. That seems almost to go without saying, but I think it is
useful to remind ourselves that indeed we will do that.
For instance, during the last dispute, the Maritime Lumber Bureau
representing the Maritime Provinces industries issued a joint press release
with the coalition blaming other provinces for their subsidies; quite an
extraordinary thing to do. With Quebec's request for exclusion, successfully
showed at the Department of Commerce level that there were no subsidies in
Quebec. It is a market-based system.
The British Columbia log export ban was responsible for at least sixty
percent of the 6.5% duty according to the Department of Commerce. But
there is really no control on British Columbia, as there are regarding other
provinces, to effect policy changes in that regard.
Increasingly, also, the national interest will be left to private parties to
decide. The negotiation of an agreement like the Softwood Lumber
Agreement clearly went against the general rule, which was free trade.
Because the industry appeared solid in its support of that solution, the federal
government negotiated it. Also, I think we have to remember that there is
really nobody at the helm. That is, there is no one that looks after either the
7 North American Free Trade Agreement Between the government of Canada, the
government of Meixco, and the government of the U.S., Dec. 17, 1992, Can. T.S. 1994 No.
2.32 I.L.M. 298 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994). Ch. 19.
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national interest in the United States or in Canada. So you better be prepared
yourself to deal with this.
Our view of things is that you should litigate, not negotiate, on a sectoral
basis. The only really useful negotiations that can happen between Canada
and the United States on trade matters are negotiating on rules, either in the
WTO or bilaterally, if we can do it. We should not step into the ring alone.
We should know our friends and seek common action, common goals. This
is what we are doing with the alliance that we have identified in the United
States.
Finally, we should be prepared to live with the results of litigation, that is,
pay the duty or cease and desist; change the policies in question. This is
probably the hardest part and certainly seems to be the hardest part for the
U.S. side, as well. I think we will have continuing complaints about softwood
lumber. It is the same in other fields. Wheat was mentioned yesterday. They
had eight investigations in ten years. This is not conscionable, but, as I said, I
do not think anyone really is in charge of the process.
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